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Summary 
The Department for Education (the Department) has had a clear focus on improving 
standards in schools. It has created more academies as autonomous institutions based on 
the view that this is the best way to raise educational standards. Nonetheless there are still 
1.6 million children being educated in schools in England that are less than ‘good’. The 
Department takes a light touch approach to school oversight, and is reluctant to collect 
enough information to be effective at identifying and responding to risks to school 
performance. In particular, early action to prevent decline or continuing poor performance 
in schools is happening rarely. The Department emphasises performance as measured by 
exam results and Ofsted inspections. But it relies heavily on whistleblowers to identify 
significant risks of failure, such as in safeguarding arrangements, financial integrity or 
governance. Local authorities also have a role in intervening when schools fail, but the 
Department does not know enough about local authorities’ oversight activities. The 
Department does not know whether they have the capacity to improve their schools; or 
what interventions they use and at what cost. In addition, the Department does not know 
enough about the effectiveness of the sponsors who are supposed to improve schools 
through the Academies Programme. Research by the Sutton Trust and evidence from 
Ofsted suggests performance of sponsors is variable. Some have expanded too fast and a 
significant number are failing to improve standards in their schools. Over several years, we 
have recommended that the Department improve the way it supports and regulates the 
autonomous schools system. We hope that the Department will now respond to our 
recommendations more fully in order to reduce the likelihood of further unforeseen school 
scandals, like the ‘Trojan horse’ affair in Birmingham. 
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Introduction 
The Department for Education is accountable to Parliament for the overall performance of 
the school system in England. There are 21,500 state-funded schools, of which 17,000 are 
maintained schools overseen by local authorities, and 4,500 are academies directly 
accountable to the Secretary of State. The Department’s overall objective is for all children 
to have the opportunity to attend a school that Ofsted rates as ‘good’ or better. To achieve 
this, the Department expects school leaders, along with governors and trustees, to manage 
resources effectively in an increasingly autonomous system so as to raise educational 
standards. The Department presides over a complex and confused system of external 
oversight, sharing responsibility for oversight with the Education Funding Agency (the 
Agency, which is part of the Department) and 152 local authorities. The Department has 
set up frameworks that specify how it and other bodies should assess school performance 
and when they should intervene. The main formal interventions are: warning notices to 
raise formal concerns about a school’s performance; changing a school's governing body; 
and for local authority maintained schools and converter academies, turning the school 
into a sponsored academy. There are 460 sponsors which support and manage 1,900 
academies. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
1. There are significant gaps in the Department’s knowledge of performance in 
individual schools. The Department’s narrow set of indicators means that it has not 
spotted important failures until too late and is over-reliant on whistleblowers. The 
Department focuses on educational performance but schools can change very 
quickly. Ofsted does not currently inspect ‘good’ schools for up to five years and 
‘outstanding’ schools are exempt from routine inspection. Both Ofsted and the 
National Association of Head Teachers consider more regular inspections of ‘good’ 
and ‘outstanding’ schools are necessary to ensure high standards. Also schools can 
have safeguarding or governance and financial management issues while still 
performing well in terms of educational attainment. In such circumstances, the 
Department is reliant on whistleblowers to contact them, as happened recently in 
Birmingham, where two of the schools at the centre of the allegations had been rated 
‘outstanding’ and were therefore exempt from routine inspection. The Agency has 
developed a risk analysis tool, which has some indicators of financial performance, 
but on the basis of what we heard, no indicators of efficiency or value for money, and 
neither the Department nor the Agency have any ‘leading’ indicators of safeguarding 
issues. (A ‘leading’ indicator gives an indication of risks before problems occur, as 
opposed to a ‘lag’ indicator of performance in the past.) 
Recommendation: The Department should develop leading indicators to fill the 
gaps in its information on governance, efficiency and safeguarding, and then 
incorporate them into its expectations of how oversight bodies identify 
underperformance. 
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2. Weak oversight arrangements can mask problems in some schools, which then go 
undetected until serious damage has been done. The Department has increased the 
autonomy of schools and oversight bodies. It has done so without an overall strategy, 
leading to confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the Department, the 
Agency, local authorities and academy sponsors, and allowing schools to fall through 
gaps in the system. Without a consistent understanding of the roles of existing and 
new oversight bodies, school failure can go unnoticed. Of the schools rated 
‘inadequate’ in 2012/13, 36% had previously been rated ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’; 
oversight bodies need to work together to identify and intervene earlier in time to 
challenge and support schools. In September 2014 the Department introduced eight 
Regional Schools Commissioners, a welcome recognition of the need to provide 
more local intelligence and oversight for the growing number of academies. 
However, with 4,500 academies it is hard to believe that the Commissioners will have 
enough local knowledge on their own. There is also a risk that introducing 
commissioners will increase confusion about roles, especially where local authorities 
are already working constructively with academies.  
Recommendation: The Department needs to clarify its own role, and the roles of 
Regional Schools Commissioners, local authorities and the Agency and specificy 
how they will work together to share information and identify failure at an earlier 
stage. In addition the Department should set clear and explicit expectations for 
Regional Schools Commissioners to ensure that they make effective use of local 
authorities’ relationships with and local knowledge about schools and academies in 
their areas. In the next 18 months, the Department should evaluate the effectiveness 
of the Regional Schools Commissioners, and how constructively they are working 
with local authorities. The Department should also explicitly set out the set up and 
running costs of Regional School Commissioners so that value can be assessed. 
3. Lack of clarity in the Department’s guidance has contributed to a situation where 
some local authorities do not understand their safeguarding duties towards 
pupils in academies. Under the Children’s Act 1989, local authorities are responsible 
for monitoring safeguarding arrangements in all schools; these responsibilities 
include academies set up in recent years. However, out of the 87 local authorities 
surveyed by the National Audit Office, 13 said they did not monitor academies’ 
safeguarding arrangements, and 13 said they would not intervene directly in an 
academy if pupil safety was threatened. We were surprised to hear that the 
Department had done nothing to address this potentially serious gap in oversight 
since becoming aware of it during the NAO’s work. After our evidence session we 
wrote to the Permanent Secretary requesting that he write immediately to all local 
authorities to confirm and clarify their duties in relation to safeguarding in 
academies. It is likely that some local authorities, in the context of wider messages 
about the academies’ autonomy, felt that safeguarding in academies was no longer 
their responsibility. 
Recommendation: The Department should clarify local authorities’ safeguarding 
responsibilities towards schools in a single document, including whether or not local 
authorities have the power to direct academies to change their safeguarding 
arrangements. 
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4. The Department lacks information about the number and quality of school 
governors. In an increasingly autonomous school system that relies on self-
improvement, the Department relies on schools having good governors and strong 
leadership. The structure of governance varies depending on school type, but 
regardless of this, all governors must be aware of their responsibilities and be able to 
provide sufficient support and challenge. The National Governors Association 
estimates there are around 350,000 governors in England, but the Department does 
not have any record of the number, skills and capacity of governors or trustees, even 
though it relies on them to understand and challenge school performance. The 
failure of the Department and the local authority to identify problems with 
governors at Birmingham schools that were part of the ‘Trojan Horse’ inquiry 
highlights one risk of not knowing enough about governors. We have also previously 
reported on problems with financial management and unmanaged conflicts of 
interest in schools, and these continue to cause us concern.   
Recommendation: The Department should carry out a skills audit of school 
governors and ensure that all schools provide appropriate training for all governors 
and trustees. The Department should regularly assure itself that the capability and 
capacity of governors are fit for purpose. 
5. Oversight bodies have not formally intervened in some schools that have been 
identified as underperforming. In September 2013, 179 open academies met the 
Department’s criteria for formal intervention, based on its own definition of failure 
(exam results and Ofsted rating). It should have intervened formally in all cases, but 
it only sent a warning notice to 15. The Agency also maintains a list of academies of 
national concern over financial management or governance issues. It has issued 
financial notices to improve to 4 of these academies, as a result of fraud allegations or 
financial irregularity; but there are another 7 which have been on the list for 
suspected fraud but have not received a financial notice to improve. Both the 
Department and the Agency acknowledge that their records are not good enough to 
explain why they have intervened in some academies and not others.  
Recommendation: The Department and the Agency should improve the recording 
of their decisions to identify and intervene in underperforming schools to ensure 
consistency in the approach to the schools. The Department must ensure that, as a 
minimum, all schools eligible for intervention are identified. 
6. The Department does not know enough about which formal interventions are 
most effective to tackle failure under which circumstances. Of schools inspected by 
Ofsted in 2012/13, 48% (62 out of 129) of those which had received some kind of 
formal intervention improved at their next inspection. The remainder stayed the 
same or deteriorated, with the apparent impact of different interventions varying 
significantly. Meanwhile, 59% (2,181 out of 3,696) of schools that received no formal 
intervention also improved. The Department has not done enough to evaluate the 
effectiveness of different interventions and so does not know which are the most 
cost-effective. It recognises that it needs to do more. 
Recommendation: The Department should commission a full evaluation of the 
cost-effectiveness of all formal interventions in schools. 
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7. There are no independent assessments of the effectiveness of academy sponsors 
and the Department has taken an optimistic view of sponsor capacity for too 
long. The Department’s main intervention for failing maintained schools is to match 
them with a sponsor and turn the school into a sponsored academy. Often the failing 
school will become part of a chain of academies run by one sponsor with a central 
management function. In its keenness to expand the academies programme and 
increase the number of sponsored academies, it has allowed some chains to grow too 
quickly without the necessary capacity and capability. It has currently ‘paused’ the 
growth of 18 sponsors because of concerns about their performance; these sponsors 
are currently educating almost 100,000 children. However, it has no independent 
source of information about the effectiveness of academy sponsors and the 
Department is over-reliant on whistleblowers. Ofsted is able to focus inspections on a 
number of academies within a chain and give an assessment about how well the 
chain supports those academies but, unlike in local authorities, it is unable to inspect 
the central management function of a sponsor (which is the primary mechanism for 
delivering improvement in a failing school). Unlike the powers Ofsted has to inspect 
local authorities, there is no statutory framework setting out the basis for what the 
inspectors are assessing when they look at the operation of an academy chain, and 
Ofsted awards no overall judgement or rating of academy sponsors.   
Recommendation: The Department should obtain independent judgements of the 
capacity of sponsors that run more than one academy, and should use this to 
determine which sponsors are able to grow and when it should intervene with 
particular sponsors. 
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1 Oversight of the school system 
1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from 
the Department for Education (the Department), the Education Funding Agency (the 
Agency), and Ofsted.1 We also took evidence from the National Governors Association 
and the National Association of Head Teachers. The school system in England currently 
educates almost 7 million children aged 4 to 16 years old at an annual cost of £40 billion, in 
around 21,500 state-funded schools. Of these, 17,000 are local authority maintained and 
4,500 are academies, directly accountable to the Secretary of State. The Department’s 
overall objective for the English school system is for all children to have the opportunity to 
attend a school that Ofsted, the independent inspectorate for schools, rates as ‘good’ or 
better.2  
2. The Department is responsible for the overall performance of schools in England, but 
shares its oversight responsibilities with the Agency and 152 local authorities. The 
Department, the Agency and local authorities have a range of interventions they can use to 
improve performance in underperforming schools. The main formal interventions are: 
warning notices (a formal letter raising concerns about a school’s performance); changing a 
school’s governing body; and appointing a sponsor (in which case a school becomes a 
sponsored academy). The Department’s policy is to appoint a sponsor in maintained 
schools with sustained or serious underperformance. There are 630 approved sponsors, 
460 of which are currently working with over 1,900 academies.3  
3. The system is complex, with a mix of school types. These currently include individually-
run academies (some of which have opened or converted with a sponsor’s help, and some 
without); schools that are part of academy chains; and local authority maintained schools, 
including some church schools.4 Meanwhile, the range of bodies overseeing this system has 
recently increased. From September this year, the Department’s oversight responsibilities 
are partly delivered through eight Regional Schools Commissioners, who are supported by 
around 50 head teachers.5 
4. The Department sets the standards that schools are expected to achieve. It measures 
school performance on the basis of exam results at the end of primary school, at age 11, 
and at the end of secondary school, at age 16. It also relies on Ofsted, the independent 
inspectorate for schools, to assess school performance, aiming for all schools to be judged 
‘good’ or ‘outstanding’.6 The Department depends heavily on exam performance and 
Ofsted inspections to identify underperforming schools, but evidence shows that there are 
risks to such an approach. The National Association of Head Teachers told us that there 
was a risk in relying on exam results because “if we wait until test data is available to us, 
 
1 C&AG’s Report, Academies and maintained schools: Oversight and intervention, Session 2014-15, HC 721, 30 October 
2014 
2 C&AG’s Report, paras 1-2 
3 C&AG’s Report, figure 2, para 1.7 
4 Q 26 
5 Q 56 
6 C&AG’s Report paras 1.3,2.2 
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many years of a child’s education may have gone by”.7 When we asked about intervening 
earlier, before exam results dipped, the Department admitted that “all the quantitative data 
we have about the schools system are lag indicators. We do not have any leading indicators 
on which we could take that kind of action”.8  
5. Independent inspections can provide a more holistic approach and may give early 
warning of failure, but they occur only intermittently. In particular, schools that are 
currently rated ‘good’ by Ofsted can go five years without an inspection, and those rated 
‘outstanding’ are exempt from routine inspection altogether. This is in spite of the evidence 
that ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’ schools can deteriorate. Of schools rated ‘inadequate’, the 
lowest category, in 2012/13, 36% had previously been rated ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’.9 The 
Chief Inspector of Schools told us that “not inspecting schools for a lengthy period of time 
is not a good idea”. Even under the present arrangements, about 800 schools a year are 
shown to decline from ‘good’ or better to less than ‘good’. Ofsted is currently consulting 
about introducing shorter, more frequent one-day inspections for ‘good’ schools, but there 
are no plans to change the Government’s policy of not inspecting ‘outstanding’ schools.’10 
When we asked the National Association of Head Teachers about this point, its General 
Secretary told us, “I would recommend applying the same principles and process to 
‘outstanding’ schools […] Not all my members in ‘outstanding’ schools will thank me for 
saying that, but I think it would be healthy”.11 
6. In its report the National Audit Office identified three specific aspects of school 
performance that are not well enough measured at present: governance arrangements; 
financial management; and safeguarding (how children at school are kept safe).12 We 
asked about the Department’s approach to developing indicators for these measures; it said 
that to do so would be difficult.13 In particular, the Department did not think it would be 
possible to develop leading indicators for safeguarding. The Agency told us that it was 
developing a risk-assessment tool to get as much early warning as it could from the data it 
collects about academies.14 This tool includes a measure on financial management but, 
based on the evidence we heard, this does not yet incorporate measures of value for money 
or efficiency.15  
7. We asked the Department a number of questions about the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair (which 
related to allegations of extremism in Birmingham schools), including about the 
information that had been available to oversight bodies to identify problems.16 The ‘Trojan 
Horse’ inquiry, carried out by Peter Clarke, found that the allegations had only come to 
 
7 Q 33 
8 Q 105 
9 Qq 38-39; C&AG’s Report, para 2.6 
10 Q 41 
11 Q 26 
12 Q 32; C&AG’s Report, para 9 
13 Q 107 
14 Q 110 
15 Q 110 
16 Report into allegations concerning Birmingham schools arising from the ‘Trojan Horse’ letter, Peter Clarke, July 
2014, HC 576 
9 
 
light because of whistleblowers and said that the Department’s reliance on these 
courageous individuals was too great.17 We have previously reported that the Department 
relies too heavily on whistleblowers to identify problems in schools.18 A particular issue 
was that two of the schools at the centre of the “Trojan Horse” allegations had previously 
been judged ‘outstanding’ by Ofsted and, thus, were exempt from routine inspection. We 
asked the Department about how it would get more information about such schools in 
future. It hoped that Regional School Commissioners would gain enough intelligence to 
know what was happening in academy schools between inspections, but admitted that this 
would be a challenge, with only 8 commissioners to look after 4,500 academies.19 
8. The lack of information about the quality of safeguarding in academies is made more 
important by evidence that some local authorities have not been monitoring academy 
safeguarding arrangements in line with expectations. We heard that 13 of the 87 local 
authorities (15%) that responded to a National Audit Office survey were not monitoring 
safeguarding arrangements in academies, and that 13 said they would not intervene in 
academies if pupils’ safety was threatened.20 The National Audit Office also told us that 
Local Safeguarding Children Boards, which are charged with scrutinising schools’ 
safeguarding arrangements, were expected to work with academies and maintained schools 
alike, but that these boards could not direct academies to change their safeguarding 
arrangements if they found them wanting.21 After our evidence session we wrote to the 
Department and asked the Permanent Secretary to write to all local authorities to remind 
them of their responsibilities for the safeguarding of all children in schools.22  
9. More generally, the National Audit Office survey found that local authorities took 
different approaches to academies. Over 90% of authorities were monitoring academies’ 
educational performance, with one third saying they would intervene directly if they had 
concerns.23 But this goes against the Department’s clear statement that local authorities are 
to have no role in monitoring academies, beyond safeguarding.24 Ofsted told us that local 
oversight was “absolutely critical”.25 The Department has not undertaken a wide-ranging 
review of local authority performance to check that authorities have the capacity to provide 
adequate oversight. The last time it reviewed local authorities’ plans for school 
improvement, in 2011, it had concerns in more than 80% of cases.26  
 
17 Report into allegations concerning Birmingham schools, p. 87. 
18 Public Accounts Committee – Sixty-First Report, Education Funding Agency and Department for Education 2012-13 
financial statements 12 May 2014 
19 Qq 55-59 
20 Q 123 
21 Q119; HM Government, Working Together to Safeguard Children, March 2013. The guidance states, “Local 
Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) do not commission or deliver direct frontline services […] While LSCBs do not 
have the power to direct other organisations they do have a role in making clear where improvement is needed. 
Each Board partner retains their own existing line of accountability for safeguarding.” (paragraph 3, p. 60).  
22 Permanent Secretary’s response, 19 December 2014 
23 Q 46; C&AG’s Report, para 1.14 
24 Q 66; C&AG’s Report, para 1.14 
25 Q 43 
26 Q 46; C&AG’s Report, para 4.2,figure 11 
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10. We asked the witnesses about the Department’s aim for an increasingly autonomous 
schools system, with reduced interference from the centre, and what this would mean for 
school-level governance. The National Governors Association told us that “because there is 
more autonomy, [it] makes the role of governing boards much more important, and the 
Government has recognised that”.27 We asked about the strengths and weaknesses in the 
current governance system. The National Governors Association told us that “we don’t 
know enough about where governance is right across the sector”, but that there is a “bell 
curve” between very good and very poor governance.28  
11. Unlike magistrates, school governors are not required to undergo any training before 
they take up their posts. While being an effective governor in academies and maintained 
schools requires many similar skills and attributes, such as knowing the school and being 
able to interpret data, the legal duties of governors in academies are quite different from 
those in the maintained sector. The National Governors Association told us that the 
Department had introduced risks into the system because maintained schools could 
convert to academy status without the governors in those schools being fully aware of their 
altered duties.29 
12. The Department has reviewed the arrangements for related party transactions in 
academy schools and chains. It found 17 instances where such transactions were not 
properly notified and managed and is continuing to monitor these arrangements. 30 
 
2 Intervening in underperforming schools 
13. When a school has been identified as underperforming there are three main formal 
interventions, as described in paragraph 11 above. The NAO report shows that the 
Department and other oversight bodies do not always react consistently when schools 
merit intervention, and the Department was unable to explain why this is. In particular, 
analysis shows that, in September 2013, there were 179 open academies that met the 
Department’s criteria for a warning notice owing to poor educational performance, but the 
Department only sent notices to 15. In 141 out of the 179 cases, the Department had not 
even identified the schools as being eligible for intervention.31  
14. Similarly, when the National Audit Office looked at records from the Agency, it found 
4 cases of suspected fraud where schools had received financial notices to improve, but a 
further 7 such cases where they had not. The Agency had not kept sufficiently good records 
to justify the different approaches taken.32 We questioned both the Department and the 
Agency about these findings and they acknowledged that they had not done enough to 
 
27 Q 1 
28 Qq 1,10 
29 Qq 2-5 
30 Q 126 
31 Q 142; C&AG’s Report, para 3.5 
32 Qq 193-195; C&AG’s Report, para 3.8 
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record the basis for judgements about when to intervene and that this had created a risk of 
inconsistency. They told us they were planning to demonstrate greater consistency in 
future. 33 
15. The effectiveness of formal interventions varies, and many underperforming schools 
improve without formal intervention. The NAO analysis of Ofsted ratings for all schools 
inspected in 2012/13 identified those that had been less than ‘good’ at their previous 
inspection. Some of these schools had received formal interventions in the interim, but 
these interventions were associated with a range of outcomes; 48% (62) of schools had 
improved, 39% (50) had stayed the same, and 13% (17) had deteriorated at the time of their 
next inspection. The NAO’s analysis shows that, while the apparent impact of different 
kinds of formal intervention varies significantly, the appointment of interim executive 
boards is associated with most improvement. The National Governors Association agreed 
that, in its experience, interim executive boards were often a very good way of moving a 
school out of serious difficulties. Meanwhile, 59% (2,181 out of 3,696) of schools that were 
less than ‘good’ but received no formal intervention also improved. The National 
Governors Association told us that it was surprised that such a high proportion of schools 
improved without formal intervention.34  
16. Overall, the key finding of the analysis was that the Department did not know enough 
about what makes for effective interventions. It has not sought to understand the costs and 
effectiveness of different interventions and it acknowledged in answer that it could know 
more. However, it did not provide details of any further work that it has underway at 
present.35 
17. Specifically with regard to sponsored academies, the Department drew our attention to 
the significant improvements that sponsors can make when the academy policy works 
well.36 However, it accepted that its own and others’ analyses, for example that recently 
issued by the Sutton Trust, showed too much variation in the effectiveness of sponsors and 
academy chains. Ofsted agreed, but recognised that academy chains often have to work in 
challenging circumstances. The inspectorate stressed that in order for a chain to be 
successful it needed high-quality leadership at every level of management, including head 
teachers, governors, trustees and chief executives.37 The Chief Inspector of Schools said 
that, when chains failed, “the quality of leadership at the centre of the chain has not been 
good enough and the trusteeship has not been good enough”.38 
18. We challenged the Department about whether its oversight of academy sponsors had 
kept pace with the expansion of the academies programme. We asked witnesses if the 
Department had taken an optimistic view of some sponsors’ capacity to grow.39 Ofsted told 
us that the Department had allowed some sponsors to expand “exponentially, without the 
 
33 Qq 145 and 195 
34 Qq 12-14; 92-98; C&AG’s Report, figure 9, para 3.18 
35 Q 92 
36 Q 154 
37 Q 102 
38 Q 181 
39 Qq 146, 171 
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capacity to make the necessary improvements” at schools they took over.40 Currently, there 
are 18 sponsors that the Department is not allowing to grow further because of poor 
performance in some of their schools. These sponsors run 163 academies that currently 
contain a combined total of 94,000 pupils.41 Two of the chains account for the majority of 
schools affected: AET and E-Act, which in total run 108 academies.42 The Department 
could not explain why it had allowed these chains to become so big before pausing their 
growth.43  
19. We heard about the importance of having an independent view of the effectiveness of 
academy sponsors. Ofsted currently inspects local authority school improvement services, 
but does not have the same power to inspect sponsors’ and academy chains’ central 
functions. We asked Ofsted whether it could get sufficient information about sponsors and 
academy chains from its focussed inspections of groups of schools that they run. The Chief 
Inspector of Schools told us that his preference was to have the same powers as he has for 
local authority school improvement services. He also said that he felt sponsors and chains 
might welcome the greater transparency that statutory inspection might bring, as it would 
enable Ofsted to publish a clear inspection framework.44  
 
 
40 Q 157 
41 Supplementary written evidence provided by the Department 
42 Qq 166-167 
43 Qq 166 - 171 
44 Qq 99-100 
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Formal Minutes 
Wednesday 14 January 2015 
 
Members present: 
Mrs Margaret Hodge, in the Chair 
Mr Richard Bacon 
Guto Bebb 
Stephen Hammond* 
Chris Heaton-Harris 
Meg Hillier 
Stewart Jackson 
 
 Dame Anne McGuire 
Austin Mitchell 
Stephen Phillips 
John Pugh 
Nick Smith 
Draft Report (School oversight and intervention), proposed by the Chair, brought up and 
read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 19 read and agreed to. 
Conclusions and recommendations agreed to. 
Summary agreed to. 
Resolved, That the Report be the Thirty-secondReport of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134. 
 
[Adjourned till Monday 19 January at 3.00pm 
 
* Stephen Hammond was not a Member of the Committee when it took evidence in relation 
to this Report.  
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Witnesses 
Monday 17 November 2014 
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee’s 
inquiry page at www.parliament.uk/pubaccom.  
Russell Hobby, General Secretary, National Association of Head Teachers; 
and Emma Knights, Chief Executive, National Governors Association Q 1-37 
Chris Wormald, Permanent Secretary, Department for Education; Sir 
Michael Wilshaw, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s 
Services and Skills, Ofsted; and Peter Lauener, Chief Executive, Education 
Funding Agency Q 38-200 
 
List of printed written evidence 
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